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儒家关于实践理智的观点与亚里士多德尽管不同,但具有相互可理解性。亚里士多德把心灵的实践理智的活动及其德性解说为明智,孔子与孟子则解释为“知”或“良知”。在孔子的“知”与孟子的“良知”间有一种清晰的概念的联系。“良知”是理解实践理智活动的另一种方式,区别于亚里士多德的明智的方式。这种方式可以将明智作为一个辅助性的理智力量包含进来。作为对照,对实践理智的活动及其德性的明智的理解则不能把良知的概念包含进来。在亚里士多德伦理学中,它仅仅作为“理解”被提及,而没有发展成为“良知”或“良心”的知识的概念。
The Confucian ideas of practical reason, albeit different from those of Aristotle, are mutually understandable. Aristotle interprets the activity and virtue of the practical mind of the mind as wise, while Confucius and Mencius interpret it as “knowing” or “conscience.” There is a clear conceptual connection between Confucius’ “知 知” and Mencius’s “conscience”. “Conscience” is another way of understanding practical intellectual activity, as distinct from Aristotle’s sensible approach. Wisdom can be included as a complementary intellectual power in this way. In contrast, a wise understanding of the activities and virtues that practice reasoning fails to incorporate the notion of conscience. In Aristotle’s ethics, it is merely mentioned as “understanding ”, without developing the notion of “conscience” or “conscience.”