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厂网分开后，热电厂为追求利益最大化，有虚报抬高机组最小运行方式的内生冲动。依据经济学理论，进行制度设计，加强对热电厂的专业监管，十分必要。该文将监管部门与热电厂作为博弈的双方，以监管部门对热电联产机组最小运行方式审核还是不审核、热电厂上报最小运行方式违规还是不违规为基本策略，建立一个混合策略博弈模型。针对模型的纳什均衡解，提出加大惩罚抑制电厂违规的4个原则，设计了与电厂额外收益成正比、与电厂违规程度和违规次数呈指数关系的惩罚费用函数。算例验证所设计的机制能够较好抑制热电厂的违规行为。“,”As generation management separating from power grid, some cogeneration units frequently misrepresented the minimum operating mode in order to maximize their benefit. It was put forward to reinforce the electric power regulation and design relevant principles of management according to economic theories. A mixed strategy model was set up considering the regulator and cogeneration unit as both sides of game, taking the base tactic that whether the regulator audit and the cogeneration unit misrepresent,. According to the Nash equilibrium of the model, four principles to suppress the misrepresenting of the cogeneration unit through aggravate punishment were proposed. The specific punishing function was designed to vary directly with the excess income, and to vary exponentially with penalty degree and information disclosure. Proved by the example, the designed principles of management could effectually suppress the misrepresenting of the cogeneration unit.