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腐败与环境质量的关系并未引起国内学者的足够关注。基于中国特有的公共治理结构,在Lopez和Mitra(2000)基础上构建了一个动态三层非合作博弈模型,分析中央政府、地方政府和公司三者的互动关系,提出地方腐败行为从直接和间接两个渠道会降低环境质量的假说,并利用1998~2012年省级面板数据,建立联立方程组模型,对理论假说进行了实证检验。以CO2和SO2为例,发现地区腐败行为增加了污染物的排放量,对环境污染的总体效应显著为正,并且显著存在直接效应和间接效应。基于此,政府可考虑加大环境方面职务犯罪的打击力度和适时推进政治体制改革。
The relationship between corruption and environmental quality has not drawn enough attention from domestic scholars. Based on China’s unique public governance structure, a dynamic three-layer non-cooperative game model is constructed based on Lopez and Mitra (2000). The interaction between the central government, local governments and companies is analyzed. The direct and indirect The two channels reduce the hypothesis of environmental quality, and use the provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012, the establishment of simultaneous equations model, the empirical hypothesis empirical test. Taking CO2 and SO2 for example, we found that local corruption increased the emission of pollutants, and the overall effect on environmental pollution was significantly positive, with significant direct and indirect effects. Based on this, the government may consider intensifying the crackdown on job-related crimes in the environment and promoting the reform of the political system in due course.