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本文在全支付(all-pay)拍卖的框架下,研究了一类非对称竞赛活动的最优奖励问题。我们假设竞赛组织者未知参赛者的成本信息,进而可供选择的奖励方式有两种,其一是固定奖励额;其二是线性奖励,最终奖励额由参赛者的投资内生决定。我们证明:如果投资不能完全披露成本信息,固定奖励优于线性奖励;如果投资完全披露成本信息,线性奖励可能优于固定奖励,同时我们得出了实现投资完全披露信息的一个必要条件。我们的结论不依赖于参赛者的对称性假设,不依赖于参赛者具体的成本分布函数形式,也不依赖于竞赛组织者试图最大化参赛者最大努力或最大化所有参赛者努力总和。
In the framework of all-pay auction, this paper studies the optimal incentive problem for a type of asymmetric competition. We assume that the contest organizers do not know the cost information of the contestants. There are two ways to choose the reward, one is the fixed reward; the other is the linear reward. The final reward is determined by the participants’ investment. We show that if the investment can not fully disclose the cost information, the fixed reward is better than the linear one. If the investment fully discloses the cost information, the linear one may be better than the fixed one. At the same time, we come to a necessary condition for the complete disclosure of the investment. Our conclusion does not depend on the participant’s symmetry assumption, independent of the entrant’s specific cost distribution function, nor does it depend on the contest organizers attempting to maximize the maximum effort of the contestants or maximize the total effort of all contestants.