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本文试图为“阿尔钦-德姆塞茨之谜”提供一个解释。本文认为:(1)科斯意义上的企业“权威”主要与劳务供给中的“细节”控制问题有关,因而本质上与市场上独立签约人之间的“权威”是完全不同的;(2)与市场合约中的“权威”不同,企业(雇佣合约)中的“权威”主要是因节省交易(度量)费用,选择的度量对象是投入而非产出的结果。一般而言,企业中的“权威”结构,无论是人力资产控制权的配置结构,还是非人力资产控制权的配置结构,都不过是在交易费用约束条件下,因节省交易费用自由选择合约的一种结果。这样看来,强调所谓最优的企业所有权结构,忽略现实中究竟什么样的约束条件导致这种权力结构的产生,显然是一种舍本逐末的研究方法。
This article attempts to provide an explanation for the mystery of Archen-Demsetz. This paper argues that: (1) The “authority” of a firm in the sense of Coase is mainly related to the “details” control problem in labor supply and thus is fundamentally different from the “authority” of independent contractors in the market; (2) Unlike “authority” in market contracts, the “authority” in firms (contracts of employment) is mainly the result of savings in transaction (measurement) costs, which are measured as inputs rather than outputs. In general, the “authoritative” structure of an enterprise, whether it is the configuration structure of the control over human assets or the configuration of the control over non-human assets, is nothing more than the free choice of contracts under transaction cost constraints A result. In view of this, it is obviously a round-robin research method to emphasize the so-called optimal structure of corporate ownership and to ignore what kind of constraints actually lead to the generation of such a power structure.