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Despite mounting concerns over default risks of U.S. Treasury bonds, China increased its holdings of these securities for the fourth consecutive month. The latest data from the U.S. Treasury Department, released in September, showed China purchased $8 billion additional Treasury bonds in July, following increases in April, May and June. China remains the largest overseas creditor of the U.S. Government. By the end of July, the country had held $1.1735 trillion in Treasury bonds, an increase of $13.4 billion over the end of last year and up $58.4 billion from a year earlier.
These increases would have been no surprise, had international financial markets remained tranquil. But they came at a time when Democrats and Republicans were embroiled in fierce disputes over the upper limit of the U.S. national debt. They were not able to reach a consensus until shortly before the August 2 deadline, a stalemate that sent global financial markets on a roller-coaster ride. Against this backdrop, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the United States’ top-notch AAA rating for the first time ever.
When the debt ceiling debate was at its height, Republican lawmakers openly proposed the U.S. Government pay off only domestic creditors. Calls for “selective default” shocked foreign lenders. In this context, reports that China enlarged its U.S. Treasury bond holdings sparked widespread anxiety. But it should be noted that U.S. figures do not necessarily correspond to the quantity of Treasury bonds in China’s official foreign exchange reserve investment portfolio.
Misleading data
The U.S. Treasury’s International Capital System surveys investment from foreign governments as well as companies, residents and financial institutions. Its statistics therefore do not show whether bondholders are govern- ments or private investors. Private Chinese investors have contributed greatly to recent rises in China’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities.
These nongovernmental market participants have reason to keep U.S. Treasury securities, long-term and short-term securities alike, in their foreign exchange asset mix. Chinese multinationals and financial institutions find they can gain higher returns from their idle dollar funds by purchasing foreign government bonds than simply putting them in the bank. U.S. Treasury securities have better liquidity than securities issued by any other foreign government. Their safety is supposed to be guaranteed by U.S. supremacy in the international monetary system, despite the U.S. Government’s unsustainable practice of“robbing Peter to pay Paul.”
Private Chinese investors have invested heavily in overseas securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, in recent years. China’s flourishing foreign trade, coupled with the Chinese Government’s incentive policies, has fueled the investment boom.
China launched a “qualified domestic institutional investor” scheme in 2006, allowing domestic institutions and residents to buy financial products overseas via mainland commercial banks and other financial institutions.
In 2010, private Chinese investors purchased $34.5 billion in overseas securities, including $19.9 billion in debt securities. In the first quarter of this year, investment in overseas securities reached $6.8 billion, including $3.6 billion in debt securities.
Since the Chinese Government published its first international investment position report in 2004, private investors’ overseas securities investment has been on an upward spiral. Although total investment declined slightly in 2008 and 2009 under the impact of the global financial crisis, it picked up quickly in 2010, hitting $257.1 billion by the end of the year.
By the end of March this year, the figure had reached $263.5 billion, up $6.4 billion from the end of last year. Debt securities investment abroad totaled $200.3 billion by the end of March, an increase of $6.2 billion from the end of last year. Debt securities accounted for the majority of the increased overseas securities investment by private Chinese investors.
Given its fiscal incompetence and stark lack of solidarity, Europe is currently mired in an even deeper debt crisis than the United States. Japan has yet to recover from devastation caused by the massive earthquake and tsunami in March. Under these circumstances, many private Chinese investors have downsized their portfolio investment in Japan and Europe and shifted to less risky dollardenominated assets.
The rapid growth of private Chinese investment abroad has made it impossible to gauge China’s foreign exchange reserve investment mix based on U.S. Treasury data. If foreign governments and institutional investors want to profiteer from following the direction of China’s foreign exchange reserve investment, their attempts are likely to fail.
Moreover, not all the additional U.S. Treasury bonds in China’s official foreign exchange reserves are purchased with increased principal. Instead, a large part of them are bought with China’s investment returns. China has reaped increasing profits from its foreign exchange reserve investment. The country’s balance of payments statements show investment income soared from $35.6 billion in 2005 to $131 billion in 2010.
In light of these factors, there is reason to believe U.S. Treasury Department data may give a false impression that China keeps pumping new foreign exchange reserves into U.S. Treasury bonds.
Mutual dependence
While China relies on the United States as one of its main export markets, the United States depends on financing from China. This so-called “balance of financial terror” has helped ensure the stability of Sino-U.S. relations. If Washington assumes Beijing will continue to boost its Treasury bond holdings no matter how badly the U.S. economy performs, the balance will be tilted, posing risks to overall Sino-U.S. relations.
The debate over the national debt ceiling in the United States has brought to light flaws in U.S. political and economic systems. The moral hazards created by U.S. politicians’ calling for “selective default” have also sounded the alarm for investors. If it wants to prevent China from selling Treasury bonds, the United States must guarantee the safety of China’s investment.
U.S. Treasury bonds and China’s investment safety were high on the agenda during U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to China in August. While in China, Biden projected an air of modesty almost unparalleled by other visiting senior U.S. officials since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1979.
In particular, he said the United States appreciated China’s investment, showing Washington has acknowledged the rise of China’s status in the two countries’ economic relations. He applauded China so much that conservative U.S. media accused him of cozying up to the country.
Biden, of course, made pledges to reassure China on U.S. debt. Presumably, he would have promised the U.S. Government will pursue a responsible fiscal policy, cut its public debt and refrain from debt default.
Considering the United States’ importance to the economies of China and world at large, the Chinese Government will take a prudent stance on its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. But Washington should see to it that the emerging moral hazards in the United States do not harm its interdependent relationship with China.
These increases would have been no surprise, had international financial markets remained tranquil. But they came at a time when Democrats and Republicans were embroiled in fierce disputes over the upper limit of the U.S. national debt. They were not able to reach a consensus until shortly before the August 2 deadline, a stalemate that sent global financial markets on a roller-coaster ride. Against this backdrop, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the United States’ top-notch AAA rating for the first time ever.
When the debt ceiling debate was at its height, Republican lawmakers openly proposed the U.S. Government pay off only domestic creditors. Calls for “selective default” shocked foreign lenders. In this context, reports that China enlarged its U.S. Treasury bond holdings sparked widespread anxiety. But it should be noted that U.S. figures do not necessarily correspond to the quantity of Treasury bonds in China’s official foreign exchange reserve investment portfolio.
Misleading data
The U.S. Treasury’s International Capital System surveys investment from foreign governments as well as companies, residents and financial institutions. Its statistics therefore do not show whether bondholders are govern- ments or private investors. Private Chinese investors have contributed greatly to recent rises in China’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities.
These nongovernmental market participants have reason to keep U.S. Treasury securities, long-term and short-term securities alike, in their foreign exchange asset mix. Chinese multinationals and financial institutions find they can gain higher returns from their idle dollar funds by purchasing foreign government bonds than simply putting them in the bank. U.S. Treasury securities have better liquidity than securities issued by any other foreign government. Their safety is supposed to be guaranteed by U.S. supremacy in the international monetary system, despite the U.S. Government’s unsustainable practice of“robbing Peter to pay Paul.”
Private Chinese investors have invested heavily in overseas securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, in recent years. China’s flourishing foreign trade, coupled with the Chinese Government’s incentive policies, has fueled the investment boom.
China launched a “qualified domestic institutional investor” scheme in 2006, allowing domestic institutions and residents to buy financial products overseas via mainland commercial banks and other financial institutions.
In 2010, private Chinese investors purchased $34.5 billion in overseas securities, including $19.9 billion in debt securities. In the first quarter of this year, investment in overseas securities reached $6.8 billion, including $3.6 billion in debt securities.
Since the Chinese Government published its first international investment position report in 2004, private investors’ overseas securities investment has been on an upward spiral. Although total investment declined slightly in 2008 and 2009 under the impact of the global financial crisis, it picked up quickly in 2010, hitting $257.1 billion by the end of the year.
By the end of March this year, the figure had reached $263.5 billion, up $6.4 billion from the end of last year. Debt securities investment abroad totaled $200.3 billion by the end of March, an increase of $6.2 billion from the end of last year. Debt securities accounted for the majority of the increased overseas securities investment by private Chinese investors.
Given its fiscal incompetence and stark lack of solidarity, Europe is currently mired in an even deeper debt crisis than the United States. Japan has yet to recover from devastation caused by the massive earthquake and tsunami in March. Under these circumstances, many private Chinese investors have downsized their portfolio investment in Japan and Europe and shifted to less risky dollardenominated assets.
The rapid growth of private Chinese investment abroad has made it impossible to gauge China’s foreign exchange reserve investment mix based on U.S. Treasury data. If foreign governments and institutional investors want to profiteer from following the direction of China’s foreign exchange reserve investment, their attempts are likely to fail.
Moreover, not all the additional U.S. Treasury bonds in China’s official foreign exchange reserves are purchased with increased principal. Instead, a large part of them are bought with China’s investment returns. China has reaped increasing profits from its foreign exchange reserve investment. The country’s balance of payments statements show investment income soared from $35.6 billion in 2005 to $131 billion in 2010.
In light of these factors, there is reason to believe U.S. Treasury Department data may give a false impression that China keeps pumping new foreign exchange reserves into U.S. Treasury bonds.
Mutual dependence
While China relies on the United States as one of its main export markets, the United States depends on financing from China. This so-called “balance of financial terror” has helped ensure the stability of Sino-U.S. relations. If Washington assumes Beijing will continue to boost its Treasury bond holdings no matter how badly the U.S. economy performs, the balance will be tilted, posing risks to overall Sino-U.S. relations.
The debate over the national debt ceiling in the United States has brought to light flaws in U.S. political and economic systems. The moral hazards created by U.S. politicians’ calling for “selective default” have also sounded the alarm for investors. If it wants to prevent China from selling Treasury bonds, the United States must guarantee the safety of China’s investment.
U.S. Treasury bonds and China’s investment safety were high on the agenda during U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to China in August. While in China, Biden projected an air of modesty almost unparalleled by other visiting senior U.S. officials since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1979.
In particular, he said the United States appreciated China’s investment, showing Washington has acknowledged the rise of China’s status in the two countries’ economic relations. He applauded China so much that conservative U.S. media accused him of cozying up to the country.
Biden, of course, made pledges to reassure China on U.S. debt. Presumably, he would have promised the U.S. Government will pursue a responsible fiscal policy, cut its public debt and refrain from debt default.
Considering the United States’ importance to the economies of China and world at large, the Chinese Government will take a prudent stance on its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. But Washington should see to it that the emerging moral hazards in the United States do not harm its interdependent relationship with China.