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自主创新能够驱动产业结构升级,推动一国经济发展,其重要性毋庸置疑。对企业间自主创新的行为策略进行了博弈分析,结合我国国情建立了政府补贴的自主创新博弈模型。研究表明,如果政府在企业创新时给予一次性直接补贴或者阶梯式补贴,后发优势的等待博弈将转化为抢先进入博弈,企业具有抢先创新的动机。因此,政府可以通过税收、补贴等不同的政策组合激励企业积极创新。
Independent innovation can drive the upgrading of industrial structure and promote the economic development of a country. Its importance is undoubted. Conducted a game analysis on the behavioral strategies of independent innovation among enterprises, and established an independent innovation game model of government subsidies according to China’s national conditions. The research shows that if the government gives a one-time direct subsidy or a step-by-step subsidy in the process of enterprise innovation, the waiting game of late-onset advantage will turn into a preemptive game and the enterprise has the motivation of preemptive innovation. Therefore, the government can motivate enterprises to innovate actively through different policy combinations such as taxes and subsidies.