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为激励当事人采取适当措施,实现最佳的事故预防效果并促进社会成本的最小化,在分析我国当前民事侵权责任归责原则体系的基础上,将危险责任作为一种独立的归责原则,并在此基础上,建立过错责任与危险责任耦合的生产安全事故二元归责原则体系。同时,采用汉德公式的思想和博弈论的方法,从过错责任原则和危险责任原则2方面,分析和比较生产经营活动中当事人的安全投入和行为选择。结果表明:在过错责任的归责原则下,当预防成本小于事故成本时,对侵害人和受害人都能产生事故预防的激励;在危险责任的归责原则下,对受害人不会产生事故预防的激励,而预防成本小于事故成本时,能对侵害人产生事故预防的激励。
In order to motivate the parties to take appropriate measures to achieve the best effect of accident prevention and to promote the social costs minimization, based on the analysis of the current system of liability attribution of civil tort liability in our country, the liability of risk is taken as an independent principle of liability and On this basis, the principle of binary imputation of production safety accident system, which is a combination of fault liability and dangerous liability, is established. At the same time, adopting the method of Hande formula and game theory, this paper analyzes and compares the safety investment and behavior choice of the parties involved in the production and operation activities from the principle of fault liability and risk responsibility principle. The results show that under the principle of attribution of fault liability, when the prevention cost is less than the accident cost, the incentive of accident prevention can be given to both the aggressor and the victim. Under the principle of imputation of dangerous liability, no accident will be caused to the victim Prevention of incentives, and prevention costs less than the cost of the accident, the insurrection can have an incentive to prevent accidents.