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文章主要讨论制度变迁过程中那些无效率的制度均衡是如何形成的。在对利益集团经济行为进行分析的基础上,主要考察了Davis和North理论意义上的第一和第二行动集团在制度变迁中的作用。研究表明,由于利益集团自身利益与社会利益之间存在着冲突,因此即使是启动和推进制度变迁过程的第一和第二行动集团,也有可能妨碍制度变迁达至最优点,使其掉入“陷阱”之中。
The article mainly discusses how the inefficient institutional equilibrium formed during institutional change. On the basis of analyzing the economic behavior of interest groups, this paper mainly investigates the role of the first and second groups of action in the theoretical sense of Davis and North in institutional changes. The research shows that because of the conflict between the self-interests of interest groups and the social benefits, even the first and second action groups that initiate and promote the process of institutional change may hinder the institutional change from reaching the optimal point, Among the “trap”.