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本文借助博弈模型从理论上探讨了包含多重竞争策略的政府竞争问题。我们导入了两种不同竞争策略:税率竞争和财政支出竞争,全面分析了政府财政竞争问题,并利用我国2006-2010年间的253个地级市相关数据,采用广义空间两阶段最小二乘法(GS2SLS)进行实证分析。结果表明政府间的竞争具有多样性和灵活性,例如,当相邻的地级市降低税率时,本地级市将试图通过降低税率或(和)提高公共支出水平来吸引流动资本。
This paper explores the issue of government competition involving multiple competitive strategies theoretically by means of the game model. We have introduced two different competitive strategies: tax rate competition and fiscal expenditure competition, a comprehensive analysis of the government financial competition issues, and using the data of 253 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2010, using the generalized space two-stage least squares method (GS2SLS )conduct empirical research. The results show diversity and flexibility in intergovernmental competition. For example, when neighboring prefecture-level cities reduce their tax rates, local-level cities will try to attract liquid capital by lowering tax rates and / or raising public spending levels.