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文章把地方政府的财政透明度纳入企业微观行为的分析体系,根据《2012年中国市级政府财政透明度研究报告》和《2012年世界银行中国企业调查数据》等统计资料,实证检验了财政透明度对企业产能过剩的两种影响机制——企业“主观”投资偏误形成机理和“被动”投资偏误形成机理。研究发现:(1)财政透明度的提高会增加企业对政府行为的理性预期,减少其对外部经营环境的不确定性判断,抑制了企业由于“主观”投资偏误而导致的产能利用率低下、产能过剩现象;(2)财政透明度的提高增加了政府干预土地要素市场的成本,继而减少了企业因政府干预土地要素市场而产生的“被动”投资偏误,产能利用率提高。
This article incorporates the fiscal transparency of local governments into the analysis system of micro-behavior of enterprises. According to the statistical data of “2012 China Municipal Government Transparency Research Report” and “2012 World Bank Survey of Chinese Enterprises”, the article empirically tests the effects of fiscal transparency on enterprises Two Influencing Mechanisms of Overcapacity: Formation Mechanism of Enterprise ’s “Subjective” Investment Errors and Formation Mechanism of “Passive” Investment Errors. The findings are as follows: (1) The improvement of financial transparency will increase the rational expectations of the government on government behavior, reduce the uncertainty of the external business environment and inhibit the capacity utilization rate of enterprises due to the “subjective” investment bias Low and excess capacity; (2) The increase of financial transparency increases the cost of government intervention in the market of land factor, thus reducing the “passive” investment bias caused by the government intervention in the market of land factor and improving the capacity utilization rate.