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公司制度发展到 2 0世纪 6 0年代已趋于成熟 ,它导致了控制权与剩余索取权相对分离 ,这是西方国家 2 0世纪 6 0年代形成混合购并高潮的主要原因。但混合购并是以提高管理者的控制权为主要目的 ,因而多数公司购并后业绩并未得到改善 ,所以在 2 0世纪 6 0年代混合购并浪潮中形成的多元化经营公司 ,现在纷纷剥离非核心业务 ,呈现出突出主业的经营趋势。而我国公司购并兴起之初 ,混合购并便成为上市公司购并的主导形式 ,本文通过对部分购并后的公司业绩进行财务分析 ,发现大多数上市公司购并后业绩普遍不佳 ,因而采用博弈论模型 ,论证了这种现象出现的原因在于我国证券市场上控制权与剩余索取权是绝对分离的。建立经济学模型 ,进一步分析控制权与剩余索取权分离的不同程度对混合购并效率的不同影响。
The development of the corporate system has matured into the 1960s. It has resulted in the relative separation of control rights and residual claim rights. This is the main reason why the Western countries formed mixed upsurges in the 1960s. However, mergers and acquisitions are mainly aimed at improving the control of managers. Therefore, the performance of most companies after mergers and acquisitions has not improved, so diversified companies formed in the wave of mixed acquisitions in the 1960s are now stripping non-core companies. The business presents a business trend that highlights the main business. At the beginning of the rise of China’s corporate mergers and acquisitions, mixed acquisitions have become the dominant form of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. Through the financial analysis of the company’s performance after partial mergers and acquisitions, this article finds that most of the listed companies’ performance after merger and acquisition is generally poor. Therefore, a game theory model is adopted. The reason why this phenomenon appears is that the control rights and residual claim rights in China’s securities market are absolutely separated. An economic model was established to further analyze the different effects of different degrees of separation of control rights and residual claim rights on the efficiency of mixed mergers and acquisitions.