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本文明确引入由外部性引起的交易费用这一概念,并在一个初步的模型中给出其上限的数值度量。我们把外部性存在时由于参与人的搭便车动机而产生的社会总支付损失定义为由外部性引起的交易费用。在一个公共品自愿提供的模型框架中,通过引入联盟的适当规则,我们讨论了联盟在自我约束前提下通过线性联盟规则所能得到的最优结果,并把这一结果下的社会总支付和社会最优状况下的社会总支付之间的差,作为在这个模型中由外部性引起的交易费用上限的度量。
This article explicitly introduces the concept of transaction costs caused by externality and gives a numerical measure of its ceiling in a preliminary model. We define the total social disbursement loss due to participants’ free-riding motivation in the presence of externalities as transaction costs caused by externalities. In a model framework voluntarily provided by public goods, by introducing the appropriate rules of the coalition, we discuss the optimal outcome that the coalition can obtain through the rules of linear coalition under the constraint of self-restraint and compare the total social payoff under this result with The difference between the total social payments under social optimal conditions is a measure of the cap on transaction costs caused by externalities in this model.