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通常认为,多重可实现是当代心灵哲学中支持非还原物理主义的关键论证。福多和金在权对多重可实现的不同理解方式表明,对该论证理论意蕴的探讨将不可避免会触及到属性的本体论层面,特别是属性下面的因果力机制。就非还原物理主义的目标而言,其实现概念必须能够确保被实现的心灵属性具有相对于其物理实现者的自主因果力,而且能清楚地说明其因果作用机制。然而,以舒梅克的子集实现观为代表的现有的实现概念却难以达成上述理想,以至实现概念至多是对身心关系问题的有用刻画,而远非其解答。
It is generally accepted that multiple achievable is the key argument in support of non-reductive physicalism in contemporary philosophical philosophy. The different ways in which Fodor and Kim are right to multiple understandings suggest that the exploration of the theoretical implications of this argument will inevitably touch on the ontological aspect of the property, especially the causal mechanism underlying the property. For the purposes of non-reductive physicalism, the concept of its realization must be able to ensure that the attributes of the mind being realized have independent causal forces relative to their physical implementers and clearly explain their causal mechanisms. However, the existing concept of realization represented by Schumer’s sub-set of views is difficult to reach the above ideal, so that the concept of realization is at most a useful depiction of the relationship between body and mind, rather than its answer.