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考虑由单个制造商与单个零售商组成的供应链系统,零售商为Stackelberg领导者,制造商为跟随者。在零售商具有促销活动的情况下,本文分别建立了集中式决策、分散式决策以及收益共享成本共担契约决策的供应链模型,并对三种情况下的决策变量进行比较分析。研究表明:在零售商具有促销策略时,采用分散式渠道决策无法促进渠道成员的协调;在合适的契约参数设置下,采用收益共享成本共担契约决策,可使供应链的总利润等于集中式决策时渠道的总利润,且制造商与零售商的最优利润均大于分散式决策时的最优利润。
Consider a supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer with a single retailer, retailers as Stackelberg leaders, and manufacturers as followers. In the case of retailers with promotions, the paper establishes a supply chain model of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making and contract-sharing of revenue sharing costs, respectively, and makes a comparative analysis of the three decision variables. The research shows that when the retailer has the promotion strategy, the decentralized channel decision-making can not promote the coordination of the channel members. Under the set of appropriate contractual parameters, the total profit of the supply chain is equal to the centralized one The total profit of channels in decision-making, and the optimal profits of manufacturers and retailers are greater than the optimal profits of decentralized decision-making.