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在传统的新古典经济学中,所有与资源配置和财富分配有关的经济活动,都是由完备契约治理下自利个体之间的非人格化市场交换完成的。伴随着信息经济学和新制度经济学的发展,越来越多的新古典经济学者认识到完备契约假设过于脱离现实,现实世界几乎所有的市场交易都是不可能签订完备契约的;同时,实验经济学和行为经济学的研究表明,经济人的偏好类型是异质的,部分经济人具有自利偏好,部分经济人具有社会偏好。在交易不可签订完备契约的市场中,基于社会偏好的行为规范会对不完备契约型市场产生重要的互补性治理作用。
In traditional neoclassical economics, all economic activities related to the allocation of resources and the distribution of wealth are done by the exchange of impersonal markets between self-interested individuals under perfect contractual control. With the development of information economics and new institutional economics, more and more neoclassical economists recognize that the complete contract hypothesis is too far from reality, and almost all the real-world market transactions are impossible to sign a complete contract. Meanwhile, the experiment Studies in economics and behavioral economics show that the preference types of economic people are heterogeneous, some of them have self-interest preference, and some of them have social preference. In markets where transactions can not be concluded in perfect contracts, codes of conduct based on social preferences can have important complementary governance roles in incomplete contractual markets.