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目前,我国钢铁行业出现了产能过剩和较高的库存,铁矿石现货价格下跌,这一现象是经济发展周期的客观表象,还是三大矿商瓦解中钢协“统一战线”的一个营销策略。本文分别从短期和长期两个角度对这一问题做出分析,以博弈论为工具建立新的理论模型和研究框架,所得结论显示:在短期内我国钢铁行业集中度较低的情况下,钢企之间的博弈结果是“囚徒困境”均衡,这在一定程度上解释了我国铁矿石进口价格“逢谈必涨”的迷局,铁矿石进口价格短期下跌是矿商营销策略的可能性较大;而在长期内我国钢铁行业集中度较高的前提下,铁矿石价格下跌是钢铁行业发展周期的客观趋势。根据博弈结果,寻找我国钢企在短期内摆脱铁矿石价格谈判困境的方法和措施,以及如何在铁矿石价格谈判的长期博弈中抢占先机,做到未雨绸缪,提出一些前瞻性的观点和建议。
At present, overcapacity and high inventories have emerged in China’s steel industry. The spot price of iron ore has fallen. This phenomenon is an objective manifestation of the economic development cycle. It is also one of the three major miners who have disintegrated the China Steel Association and the “united front” Marketing strategy. This article analyzes the issue from short-term and long-term perspectives respectively, and uses game theory as a tool to establish a new theoretical model and research framework. The conclusion shows that in the short term, the steel industry in our country has a low degree of concentration, The result of the game between enterprises is the “prisoner’s dilemma” equilibrium, which to some extent explains China’s iron ore import prices “every conversation will be up ” puzzle, the short-term decline in iron ore import prices are miners Marketing strategy is more likely; and in the long term, the concentration of China’s steel industry is higher under the premise of the iron ore price decline is the development trend of the steel industry, the objective trend. According to the results of the game, we can find ways and measures for Chinese steel enterprises to get rid of the predicament of iron ore price negotiations in the short term and how to seize opportunities in the long-term game of iron ore price negotiations so as to take precautions and put forward some forward-looking opinions Suggest.