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为确定影响物流企业员工安全参与行为的因素与演化路径,推动对物流企业员工的安全监管,在员工和物流企业具有有限理性的前提下,从物流企业与员工之间的博弈机理出发,构建了员工安全参与行为的演化博弈模型。采用系统动力学方法分析模型的演化趋势,通过数值仿真分析物流企业员工安全参与行为及演化路径。结果表明,奖励力度、惩罚力度等参数影响着员工策略的变化,物流企业可加大对员工不积极参与安全行为的处罚力度,并适当提高奖励力度,从而提高员工的参与安全活动的积极性;物流企业还应建立奖励与惩戒相结合的管理制度,同时通过技术创新降低监督成本,实现对员工安全的有效监管。
In order to determine the factors that affect the safety behavior of logistics enterprises and their evolvement paths and promote the safety supervision of logistics enterprises, under the premise of limited rationality of employees and logistics enterprises, starting from the game mechanism between logistics enterprises and employees, Evolutionary Game Model of Employee Safety Participation Behavior. System dynamics method is used to analyze the evolution trend of the model. The numerical simulation is used to analyze the employee safety participation behavior and evolution path of logistics enterprises. The results show that the parameters such as rewards and punishments affect the change of employees’ strategies. The logistics enterprises can increase the penalties for the employees not actively participating in the safety behaviors and appropriately increase the rewards so as to enhance their enthusiasm for participating in the safety activities. The logistics Enterprises should also establish a combination of reward and punishment management system, while reducing supervision costs through technological innovation, to achieve effective supervision of employee safety.