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国有企业代理阶层是指国有企业高层经营管理人员,尤其是指以公司形式存在的国有企业董事长和总经理。关于代理阶层激励问题的研究,现在最为活跃的是西方企业理论,尤其是代理理论。不过,西方代理理论虽然非常有助于我们从理论上分析认识我国国有企业代理阶层的激励问题,但对于该问题的解决则存在一定的局限。本文从行为科学激励理论的角度出发,针对我国国有企业代理阶层“激励空缺”问题,提出填补“激励空缺”的建议。
The agency hierarchy of state-owned enterprises refers to the senior management personnel of state-owned enterprises, especially the chairman and general manager of state-owned enterprises in the form of companies. With regard to the research on the issue of agency incentives, what is most active now is western enterprise theory, especially agency theory. However, although the western agency theory is very helpful for us to theoretically analyze and understand the issue of the incentive of the state-owned enterprises in China, there are certain limitations to the solution of this problem. From the perspective of behavioral science incentive theory, this paper proposes suggestions for filling “incentive vacancies” for the “incentive vacancy” problem of the state-owned enterprises’ agency hierarchy.