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文章针对网络服务提供者的违规操作行为进行分析,引入博弈演化理论分析网络服务提供者之间以及网络服务提供者与著作权人之间的利益关系,得到博弈演化的相关要素,建立SD风险演化模型并对模型进行仿真分析,最后验证了SD模型与演化博弈模型的一致性。结果表明,静态的惩罚机制使得网络服务提供者的违规操作率呈现波动降低,结合多因素的动态的惩罚机制能够有效地控制网络服务提供者的违规操作率。研究结果为进一步降低网络信息资源著作权风险提供了可行性的参考建议。
The article analyzes the illegal operation behavior of ISPs, introduces the game evolution theory to analyze the relationship between ISPs and ISPs and obtain the relevant elements of game evolution, establishes the SD risk evolution model And the simulation analysis of the model, and finally verify the consistency of the SD model and evolutionary game model. The results show that the static punishment mechanism causes the fluctuation rate of the irregularities of network service providers to fluctuate, and the multi-factor dynamic punishment mechanism can effectively control the illegal operation rate of network service providers. The results provide a feasible reference for further reducing the copyright risk of network information resources.