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企业集团的组织形式和特点决定了母子公司之间存在委托-代理关系。为了解决母子公司信息不对称情况下的监督问题,本文通过建立单阶段博弈和多阶段重复博弈模型,分析了影响母子公司均衡策略的因素。在单阶段博弈中,加大惩罚力度能有效降低子公司业绩操纵的概率。在多阶段博弈中,通过引入长期激励约束机制,能达成母子公司间(业绩不操纵,不监督)的博弈均衡。进而分别从短期和长期角度提出了集团母公司有效防止子公司业绩操纵的策略措施。
The organizational form and characteristics of the enterprise group determine the principal-agent relationship between the principal-agent relationship. In order to solve the problem of supervision under the asymmetric information between mother and subsidiary, this paper analyzes the factors that affect the balance strategy between mother and subsidiary company by establishing a single-stage game and a multi-stage repeated game model. In the single-stage game, increasing penalties can effectively reduce the probability of subsidiary performance control. In the multi-stage game, by introducing long-term incentive and restraint mechanisms, a game equilibrium between mother-son companies (non-performance and non-supervision) can be reached. And then put forward the strategies and measures for effectively preventing the parent company from manipulating the performance of its subsidiaries in the short-term and long-term respectively.