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当前,我国国有企业改革中最重要的问题是在公司治理模式中缺少职工的有效监督作用,从而导致国有资产大量流失,阻碍国有企业改革的深化与推进。通过建立一个简单数理模型,本文证明现有国有企业治理结构在不能解决有效监督的前提下,对企业管理者的“激励机制”可能成为“逆向激励”。将职工监督机制引入监督模型能很好地解决这一难题。本文还探讨了职工行使控制权的理论依据,并以德国的“参与制”进行经验检验,从理论与实践两方面论证职工剩余控制权的可能性与可行性。
At present, the most important issue in the reform of state-owned enterprises in China is the lack of effective supervision over the staff and workers in the corporate governance model, resulting in the drastic loss of state-owned assets and impeding the deepening and promotion of the reform of state-owned enterprises. By establishing a simple mathematical model, this paper proves that under the premise that the existing state-owned enterprise governance structure can not solve the problem of effective supervision, the “incentive mechanism” of the enterprise managers may become “adverse incentive”. Introducing the employee supervision mechanism into the supervision model can well solve this problem. This article also explores the theoretical basis for exercising the right of control by employees and examines the possibility of using the “participation system” in Germany to prove the residual control rights of employees from the aspects of theory and practice.