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在网购供应链中,网络直销商的利润往往受到物流服务商的制约。而常见的物流外包合同不能有效的协调好二者之间的利益冲突,基于此种情况,本文运用动态博弈模型在分析常见的物流合同的基础之上,设计了节约共享合同,剖析了在网购供应链中博弈主体如何采取最优策略,在寻求供应链协调的时候,也使得库存与运输之间达到联合优化,并结合实例论证了此种合同的有效性,结果表明在共享节约合同优于常见的物流外包合同,双方的努力程度、网络直销商的市场最佳定价、存货决策量和系统的利润都得到帕累托改进。
In the online shopping supply chain, the profits of network distributors are often subject to the constraints of logistics service providers. The common logistics outsourcing contract can not effectively coordinate the conflict of interest between the two. Based on this situation, this paper uses the dynamic game model to analyze the common logistics contract, How to take the optimal strategy in the supply chain game, when seeking supply chain coordination, also makes the joint optimization between inventory and transportation, and demonstrates the validity of such contract with examples. The results show that in the sharing of savings contract is better than Pareto improvements have been made in common logistics outsourcing contracts, the level of effort on both sides, the best market pricing for network distributors, the volume of inventory decisions, and the profitability of the system.