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以“农超对接”渠道为例,具有公平关切的行为主体由于受到优势或劣势不公平厌恶的驱使,其定价策略会发生一定的改变。分析不同公平参照点对各行为主体决策的影响,可以得到两点结论:1在农批市场追求较高的利润份额时,农批市场的完全不公平厌恶会压低农产品的收购价格,但不会改变渠道的公平协调状态。2若农户也同时公平关切,农户为了追求公平宁愿放弃一部分自身利益,在一定程度上降低“农超对接”渠道的整体利润,使得渠道效率不能达到帕累托最优。
Take the case of “Farm Super Docking ” as an example, the pricing behavior of the actors with fair concerns will be changed due to being driven by unfair aversion or disadvantage. Analyzing the impact of different fairness reference points on the decision-making of actors, we can get two conclusions: 1 When seeking a higher share of profit in the market, the complete unfair aversion of the market will reduce the purchase price of agricultural products, but not Change the channel’s fair coordination status. 2 If farmers are equally concerned about the fair, farmers in the pursuit of equity would rather give up some of their own interests, to a certain extent, reduce the overall profit of the “Nongchao docking ” channel, making the channel efficiency can not reach Pareto optimal.