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怀疑论是法律现实主义运动的典型主张,怀疑规则或者事实的确定性。它是对以往形式主义和机械论司法理论的反思,同时在怀疑之后还要建设,是一种建设性的怀疑主义。Frank同时主张两种怀疑论,其理论值得我们认真对待,而这是我们认真思考司法过程的性质首先要做的事。我们应当深入思考Frank及其法律现实主义在当下的理论和实践意义,着重揭示和反思支持怀疑论的那些论据,探讨法律现实主义对司法过程之性质的独特理解,这些理解所可能具有的、且没有为当时法律现实主义者所揭示的理论价值,以及这些理解对于我们当下司法实践的意义。
Skepticism is a typical claim of the legal realist movement, doubting the certainty of rules or facts. It is a reflection of the formalist and mechanistic judiciary theories of the past and, at the same time, it needs to be built after being suspected. It is a constructive skepticism. Frank also advocates two kinds of skepticism, and his theory deserves our serious treatment. This is the first thing we must do before we seriously consider the nature of the judicial process. We should think deeply about the current theoretical and practical significance of Frank and its legal realism, highlighting and reflecting on those arguments in support of skepticism, exploring the unique understanding of legal realism about the nature of the justice process that these may have, and There is no theoretical value revealed to the legal realists at the time and the significance of these understandings to our present judicial practice.