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为了增强谈判力量和提升自身的独特竞争优势，零售商开始提供自有品牌，而白有品牌的引入强化渠道成员间的竞争。本文将针对两个对称性制造商和单个零售商的渠道结构，探讨自有品牌导入对渠道竞争决策产生的影响。研究结果表明：在任何渠道权力结构下，自有品牌的导入会降低制造商品牌的利润；在制造商领导权和垂直纳什结构下，被模仿制造商品牌的利润下降更显著；而在零售商领导权结构下，未被模仿制造商品牌的利润下降更显著；在未导人自有品牌情况下，制造商处于领导权地位能提升零售商利润水平；而零售商导入自有品牌时，其结果则相反，制造商处于领导权地位会降低零售商的利润水平；在零售商领导权和垂直纳什结构下，导人自有品牌都能增加零售商利润；而在制造商领导权结构下，仅当制造商之间竞争程度较弱时，导人自有品牌能提高零售商利润。,In order to strengthen the negotiation power and improve the self special competition advantage, retailer began to provide private brand. Private label introduction intensifies channel competition. This paper analyzes the channel competition decision under the channel structure with two symmetric manufacturers and one retailer. We reach some findings： Private label introduction will result in the decline of national brands profit under any channel power structure. The decline of imitated national brand is evident under manufacturer Staekelberg and vertical Nash structure. But under retailer Stackelherg, the decline of other national brand is evident. Manufacturer Staekelberg will improve the retailer profit under no private label. On the contrary, manufacturer Stackelberg will depress retailer profit. Under retailer Stackelberg and vettical Nash structure, private label introduction will Stackelberg structure, private label introduction will increase the retailer profit. But under manufacturer increase the retailer profit only when the competition between two national brands is weak.