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在价格敏感的市场需求下,研究了一对多的两级供应链的单一产品定价及订货协调模型。卖方作为博弈主方提出批发售价、价格折扣及共同补给期策略,而作为从方的买方以最优的零售价和订货策略响应。该协调模型在Stackelberg博弈的框架下,运用遗传算法讨论了Stackelberg均衡解。并利用数值试验方法通过仿真研究分析了该协调策略的有效性和可行性。
Under the price-sensitive market demand, the single product pricing and order coordination model of one-to-many two-level supply chain is studied. As the owner of the game, the seller proposes the wholesale price, the price discount and the co-replenishment period strategy, and the buyer as the subordinate party responds with the optimal retail price and order strategy. Under the framework of Stackelberg game, the coordination model discusses the Stackelberg equilibrium using genetic algorithm. The validity and feasibility of this coordination strategy are analyzed by numerical simulation method.