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关于决策责任与恶性增资行为的关系,学术界一直没有统一的观点,归纳起来目前主要有三种不同的研究结论:一是对决策失败负有责任的管理者有显著的恶性增资倾向;二是对决策失败不负有责任的管理者也有显著的恶性增资倾向;三是没有发现决策责任与恶性增资倾向的显著关系。本文将决策责任、原生性认知和资本预算项目恶性增资三者放在同一研究框架内,在我国文化背景下,运用模拟实验方法,考察了决策责任对管理者投资选择(放弃投资还是恶性增资)的影响作用。结果表明:决策责任并不是导致管理者恶性增资的直接原因,它是通过影响管理者对项目的原生性认知而间接影响管理者的投资选择的。与管理者恶性增资行为直接相关的是管理者对项目的原生性认知。本文的研究还发现,当决策责任与原生性认知高度相关时,它与管理者的投资选择行为也密切相关。此时,通过更换对决策失败负责的管理者,可降低决策责任,达到抑制恶性增资的目的。本文的另一个研究结论是,对项目有较强的原生性认知是导致管理者恶性增资的根本原因。因此企业可在项目初始决策时,用制度性措施促使管理者多预见项目的风险,以降低管理者的原生性认知,可达到预防恶性增资发生的目的。本文的结果还表明,加大失调认知,可改变原生性认知与失调认知的权衡关系,抑制恶性增资的进一步恶化。
With regard to the relationship between decision-making responsibilities and malignant replenishment behavior, the academic community has not had a single point of view. At present, there are mainly three different research conclusions: First, managers who are responsible for decision-making failure have a significant tendency to increase their capital. Second, they are The managers who failed to take responsibility for decision-making failed to have a significant tendency to increase their capital. Third, they did not find a significant relationship between decision-making responsibilities and aggressive tendencies. This article puts the responsibility of decision-making, cognition of originality and capital increase in the capital budgeting project into the same research framework. In the context of our country’s culture, using the simulation experiment method, we examined the decision-making responsibilities for managers’ investment options (abandoned investment or malignant capital increase) The effect of The results show that the decision-making responsibility is not the direct cause of the manager’s malignant capital increase. It indirectly influences managers’ investment choices by influencing managers’ perception of the project’s originality. Directly related to the malignant replenishment of managers is the managers’ perception of the project’s originality. The study of this paper also finds that when the responsibility of decision-making is highly related to the cognition of originality, it is also closely related to the investment choice behavior of managers. At this time, by replacing the manager responsible for the failure of the decision, the responsibility for decision-making can be reduced, and the purpose of suppressing the malignant increase of capital can be achieved. Another research conclusion of this paper is that the strong cognition of the project’s originality is the root cause of the manager’s malignant capital increase. Therefore, when the project is initially decided, the company can use institutional measures to urge managers to anticipate project risks more so as to reduce managers’ perception of originality and achieve the purpose of preventing the occurrence of malignant capital increase. The results of this paper also show that increasing dissonance perception can change the trade-off relationship between native cognitive and imbalance perception, and suppress the further deterioration of malignant capital increase.