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针对由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两级Stackelberg博弈供应链,文章通过消费者剩余作为其参与企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)活动的利润函数,研究了非对称信息下零售商参与CSR和制造商参与CSR活动供应链最优决策。首先,在零售商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数对αr零售价、批发价、市场需求量、零售商利润、制造商利润和系统总利润的影响,且分析了在不同的取值范围的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*r最优值。其次,在制造商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数αm对以上决策变量的影响,同样考察了在不同的取值范围下的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*m最优值。最后,通过数值仿真验证了以上结论。
Aiming at the two-level Stackelberg game supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, this paper studies the retailer’s participation in asymmetric information through the consumer’s surplus as its profit function in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) CSR and Manufacturers Participate in CSR Activities Supply Chain Optimal Decision Making. Firstly, under the participation of retailers in CSR activities, the influence of market potential aa and participation coefficient of CSR activities on α r retail price, wholesale price, market demand, retailer profit, manufacturer profit and total system profit is discussed and analyzed. In different market potential mean value ea, the optimal coefficient of activity input α * r when the total system profit reaches the maximum. Secondly, under the CSR participation of manufacturers, the influence of the mean ea of market potential and αm of participation in CSR activities on the above decision variables is discussed. Also under the mean ea of market potential under different range of values, the total profit of the system At the maximum activity input coefficient α * m optimal value. Finally, the above conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.