论文部分内容阅读
研究面临市场风险时,何种风险分担机制能更有效提升农户与经销商合作的稳定性。首先,市场行情差时,经销商不履行已签协议的背叛行为,本质是合作协议中没有合理的风险分担约定,或约定不合理。只有当违约远期回报大于当期履约收益时,参与者才有背叛的动力,现有常见的约定收购价格上下限作法,未对合作方的远期回报作精细和理性计算,易于导致违约发生。其次,依据合作博弈中稳定性及夏普利值的成本分担原理,建立了由一个经销商和多个农户构成的多人合作博弈模型,并以此为基础推导核的解空间及以资源禀赋多寡为加权值的风险分担公理值。讨论了特定管理背景下加权夏普利值与核稳定的影响因素与主要作用机理。本文所创立的风险分担理论框架与分析模型,已能够对微观农户合作进行风险分担具体计算和分析,后续无论从宏观角度讨论市场价格波动、还是微观角度研究个体风险偏好,都可以此(或至少以此路径)为基础。
When studying the market risk, what kind of risk sharing mechanism can more effectively improve the stability of the cooperation between farmers and distributors. First of all, the market is bad, the dealer does not fulfill the betrayal signed contract, the essence is the cooperation agreement does not have a reasonable risk sharing agreement, or the agreement is not reasonable. Only when the long-term return of default is larger than the current-period performance-based return, will the participants betray the motivation. The common practice of agreeing on the upper and lower limits on the purchase price does not make detailed and rational calculations on the long-term return of the partners and is likely to lead to default. Secondly, according to the principle of cost-sharing of the stability and Shapley value in the cooperative game, a multi-person cooperative game model consisting of one dealer and several farmers is established, and based on this, the solution space of nuclear and the resource endowment Share the axioms for the risk of weights. The influencing factors and main mechanism of weighted Shapley value and nuclear stability are discussed in the context of specific management. The theoretical framework and analysis model of risk sharing established in this paper have been able to calculate and analyze the risk sharing of micro-farmers’ cooperation. The follow-up discussion on the fluctuation of market price from the macroscopic angle and individual risk appetite on the micro-level can all be done (or at least Based on this path).