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研究了电力市场中线性供应函数重复竞标时发电商学习对市场均衡的影响。为此,文中首先建立了发电商最优竞标的数学模型,并对市场均衡点进行了求解。然后说明了发电商有意愿学习,并证明了在一定条件下所有发电商都学习会导致市场均衡点价格下降,使用户受益,也使某些厂商利润下降;而在另一些条件下,则恰恰相反。但发电商全面学习所达到的均衡点价格反映了真实的市场供需关系,反映了市场作为“看不见的手”的调控作用。数字仿真结果表明了文中分析和结论的正确性。
The effect of generator learning on market equilibrium during repeated bidding of linear supply function in the electricity market is studied. To this end, the paper first establishes the mathematic model of optimal bidding for power suppliers, and solves the market equilibrium point. Then it shows that generators are willing to learn and prove that under certain conditions, all generators will learn to lead to the equilibrium point of the market price decline, so that users benefit, but also make some firms profit decline; while in other conditions, on the contrary . However, the price of the equilibrium point reached by a comprehensive study of generators reflects the true market supply-demand relationship and reflects the market’s regulatory role as an invisible hand. The numerical simulation results show the correctness of the analysis and conclusion in this paper.