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借助博弈论基本模型,针对环境行政执法中“激励的悖论”现象及非线性效应,依据混合策略纳什均衡博弈矩阵,能够分析环境行政执法中囚徒困境的发生机制,并提出改进环境行政监管执法中的动态博弈与治理策略。导致环境执法效能不足的原因,在于博弈各方行为抉择时的信息不对称与信息不充分,改进措施在于改变执法博弈中收益结构的激励侧重点,即强化对环境行政执法机构的监管,改进环境治理效果的立法机制和改进执法方式的切入点,提升对环境执法行为的日常监管效力,并在环保立法过程中强化这种结构性约束。
With the basic model of game theory, this paper analyzes the phenomenon of prisoners’ dilemma in environmental administrative law enforcement according to the “paradox of incentive” phenomenon and non-linear effect in environmental administrative law enforcement and the Nash equilibrium game matrix based on mixed strategy. Dynamic Game and Governance Strategy in Supervision and Law Enforcement. The reason why the effectiveness of environmental law enforcement is not enough lies in the information asymmetry and insufficient information in the decision-making of all parties involved in the game. The improvement measures lie in changing the incentive focus of the income structure in the law enforcement game, that is, strengthening the supervision over the environmental administrative law enforcement agencies and improving the environment The legislative mechanism of governance effect and the entry point of improving the way of law enforcement to enhance the daily regulatory effectiveness of environmental law enforcement and to reinforce this structural restraint in the process of environmental legislation.