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运用股权改革后上市公司的非平衡面板数据,控制内生性影响,从边际分析等多视角对大股东超额控制权、其他股东制衡的同期关系、跨期关系的治理效应进行了检验,实证表明,大股东现金流权增加有利于提高公司的治理效益,股权集中度上升会损害公司效益,股东制衡股增加有利于治理效益的提升,超额控制权的治理效应则不显著。
By using the unbalanced panel data of listed companies after the equity reform, we can control the endogenous influence, test the oversupply of large shareholders, the contemporaneous relationship of other shareholders and the inter-period governance effect from multiple perspectives such as the marginal analysis. Empirical results show that, The increase of cash flow right of the major shareholder helps to improve the governance efficiency of the company. The increase of the ownership concentration will damage the benefit of the company. The increase of shareholders’ check-and-balance shares is beneficial to the promotion of the governance benefit, while the governance effect of excess control is not significant.