本文研究了京津冀协同发展过程中的环境治理。在考虑跨界污染的情况下,通过建立动态博弈模型,我们对京津冀的两个代表性地区在环境治理中实行单边治理还是共同治理进行了比较分析。相对发达地区和相对落后地区对环境的重视程度不同,而且相对发达地区采用清洁技术而相对落后地区则采用污染技术。研究发现,相比单边治理,共同治理能减少环境污染,提高相对发达地区的福利水平以及两个地区整体的社会福利,但是相对落后地区的社会福利会下降。为了使共同治理得以实现,相对发达地区必须对相对落后地区进行补偿,而且跨界污染系数越高补偿数额越大。 This paper studies the environmental governance in the coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei. Considering transboundary pollution, through the establishment of a dynamic game model, we conduct a comparative analysis of the two representative areas of Jing-Jin-Ji in implementing unilateral governance or corporate governance in environmental governance. Relatively developed regions and relatively backward regions have different degrees of emphasis on the environment, and the more developed regions adopt cleaner technologies and the less developed regions adopt pollution technologies. The study found that, compared with unilateral governance, co-governance can reduce environmental pollution and improve the welfare of the relatively developed regions and the social welfare of the two regions as a whole. However, social welfare in the relatively backward regions will decline. Relatively developed regions must compensate relatively backward regions for co-governance to be realized, and the greater the cross-border pollution coefficient, the greater the compensation.