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本文利用2008—2012年国有上市公司相关数据,将高管腐败根据监管部分发现的可能性分为显性腐败和隐性腐败,本文的实证研究发现:(1)对于显性腐败,在中央国有企业中高薪可以抑制显性腐败,在地方国有企业中高薪不可以抑制显性腐败;进一步研究发现,市场化进程的提高,弱化了高薪对显性腐败的抑制作用在中央国有企业与地方国有企业之间的差异,并且处在高市场化地区的地方国有企业,高薪表现出抑制显性腐败的功效。(2)对于隐性腐败,高薪不能够抑制隐性腐败,并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败具有正相关关系,支持了管理层控制论;进一步研究发现随着市场化进程的提高和管理层权力的降低,高薪表现出了抑制隐性腐败的功效。实证研究结果表明,中国政府解决腐败问题不能盲目照搬新加坡的“高薪养廉”制度,应注重加强建设激励和监督并重的治腐机制。
Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2012, this paper divides the executives’corruption into two parts: dominant corruption and recessive corruption. According to the empirical research, we find: (1) For dominant corruption, The higher salaries of enterprises can restrain the dominant corruption, and the higher salaries of local state-owned enterprises can not restrain the dominant corruption. Further research finds that the marketization progress is weakened and the high salaries inhibit the dominant corruption in the central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises And the local state-owned enterprises in high-marketization areas, the high salary has demonstrated the effectiveness of suppressing dominant corruption. (2) For the recessive corruption, the high salary can not restrain the hidden corruption, and the executive compensation has a positive correlation with the recessive corruption, which supports the management cybernetics. Further research finds that with the marketization progress and management power Lower, high pay shows the effectiveness of inhibiting recessive corruption. The empirical study shows that the Chinese government can not blindly copy Singapore’s “high-paying and honest-paying” system to solve the corruption problem. We should pay attention to strengthening the construction of a system of governance that pays equal attention to encouragement and supervision.