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基于“中国式分权”的制度背景,剖析政府内、外部竞争对土地财政地方公共服务结构扭曲效应的影响。使用中国地级市面板数据的实证研究发现,土地财政通过诱发地方政府的财政激励、金钱激励、政治激励,造成公共服务的结构性失衡。分权背景下政府内、外部的竞争行为不仅催生了土地财政现象,并贯穿这一模式始终,是土地财政引发公共服务结构性失衡的重要原因。在考虑了政府竞争行为后,土地财政的扭曲效应有所减弱。
Based on the institutional background of “China-type decentralization ”, this paper analyzes the effect of internal and external competition on the distorting effect of the local public service structure of land finance. Empirical studies using panel data of prefecture-level cities in China found that land finance caused structural imbalances in public services by inducing financial incentives, monetary incentives and political incentives of local governments. Under the decentralized background, the internal and external competitive behavior of the government not only gave birth to the phenomenon of land finance, but also runs through this pattern and is always the important reason that the land finance causes the structural imbalance of public service. After considering the government competitive behavior, the distorting effect of land finance has been weakened.