本文讨论在企业契约的影响下会计政策选择的机制安排。由于企业契约具有的交易特别性及可塑性使得会计政策的选择具有某些产权的特性,这样由此产生经济后果吸引企业的所有者不会愿意完全将这一权力让渡给管理当局,而往往采用大股东-管理当局共同控制的方法,以防止道德风险和交易胁迫。 This article discusses the institutional arrangements for the selection of accounting policies under the influence of the corporate contract. Because of the transactional specificity and plasticity of the corporate contract, the choice of accounting policy has certain characteristics of property rights, so that the economic consequences resulting from the attraction of the owner of the enterprise will not be willing to completely pass this power over to the regulatory authorities, Big shareholders - a common control approach by regulatory authorities to prevent moral hazard and trade coercion.