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This year marks the 120th anniver- sary of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95， commonly known in China as the Jiawu War. Time has passed， but the trauma of the conflict is still felt by the Chinese people even today.
The war， during which China’s then-ruling Qing Dynasty （1644-1911） was defeated， changed the fate of the country. It exposed the dynasty’s weaknesses and led to a scramble for concessions by foreign powers in China. In the aftermath， the country spiraled into enduring political instability and turmoil that culminated with the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty.
A halfway reform
Facing crises within and without， China and Japan both chose reform as the road to reviving their respective societies since the 1860s. While Japan’s Meiji Restoration’s focus was a long-term plan to build Japan into a powerful， modern country， China’s equivalent SelfStrengthening Movement existed only to keep the Qing Dynasty alive.
The Self-Strengthening Movement’s efforts were centered on military and economic reform， such as introducing Western firearms， industrialization， and creating a modern navy.
“There is only one thing we have to learn from the ‘barbarians’—solid ships and effective guns，” scholar Feng Guifen （1809-74） wrote in the early 1860s.
The campaign began in 1861， when Prince Gong （1833-98） and Grand Councilor Wen Xiang （1818-76） proposed establishing a new office to direct foreign affairs.
During his dealings with British and French invaders in the Second Opium War （1856-60）， Prince Gong came to believe Western weaponry to be superior， and discovered that his Western opponents did not try to hide their military secrets—rather， they openly offered to help China train and equip its army after the Western fashion. Prince Gong concluded that China could accommodate the West and build up its military strength with their help.
Another central figure of the SelfStrengthening Movement was Li Hongzhang（1823-1901）， viceroy of Zhili and Minister of Beiyang. His experience with foreign armies and officers during the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion （1851-64） also opened his eyes to advanced technology of the Western armies in Asia.
In 1863， Li warned that if China did not modernize its military， they would have to face a Japan that had looked and would again look to pray on China with its new technology. He asserted that China had to strengthen itself by adopting modern Western firearms and ships to face the coming challenges. Li also instigated earlier attempts at educational reform. He originally supported the proposal for an educational mission in the United States. In 1872， the first group of Chinese boys aged 12-14 were sent to Hartford， Connecticut. In the following years up until 1881， a total of 120 Chinese students were sent in four installments.
Despite all these achievements， historians suggest the Self-Strengthening officials’ preoccupation with firearms， ships and machines and their negligence of Western political systems and culture limited the scope of the Self-Strengthening Movement and ultimately contributed to its failure.
“Their attitude partially stemmed from the belief that China was superior to the West in everything except weaponry，” said Lei yi， a researcher with the Institute of Modern History under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences（CASS）. “With such an attitude， there could be no real modernization.”
“Most of the time， local Self-Strengthening promoters fought with one another rather than cooperating. They usually thought of their achievements as the foundation of personal power，” said Li Renkai （1940-2006）， late professor with the Department of History of Baodingbased Hebei University.
Furthermore， a lack of popular participation also restricted the scope of modernization. Leadership operated in a top-down fashion， with little low-level support as there was during Japan’s Meiji Restoration.
“The primary aim of those SelfStrengthening officials was to save the ramshackle Qing Dynasty. They strove to strengthen the existing order instead of replacing it. They never considered remaking China into a modern state，” Lei said.
A modernizing Japan
Almost from the day they seized power， the Meiji statesmen in Japan had been determined to make their country a modern， powerful， and worthy of respect internationally.
“The men who seized power in 1868 were nationalists who railed against Japan’s semicolonial status. They were Japanese who were sympathetic to the problems confronting their countrymen，” suggested Matsudaira Shungaku（1828-90）， a politician during the Meiji Period（1867-1912）.
During the two Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60， Japan watched in horror as European armies forced their way into China. Their first taste of imperialism came in 1854， when the Americans forced Japan to sign the Convention of Kanagawa， which opened two Japanese ports to the United States along with other favorable arrangements. In 1858， Japan succumbed to continuing Western pressure and signed a set of treaties with the United States， Holland， Britain， France and Russia. The American treaty opened more Japanese ports， allowed commercial activities and set tariff rates.
Against this background， reformers in Japan had pinpointed the need to create more flexible governing institutions that could enlist the abilities of men of talent， promote national unity under the aegis of the Emperor of Japan and build Japan into a great power equal to the most advanced nations on the face of the globe.
Itō Hirobumi （1841-1909） voiced this sentiment when he visited Sacramento， California， in 1872， “We came to study your strength， so that by adopting widely your better ways， we may hereafter be stronger ourselves. We shall labor to place Japan on an equal basis， in the future， with those countries whose modern civilization is now our guide.”
The culmination of the Meiji reforms came in 1889， when the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was promulgated. The constitution established mechanisms for sharing power with elected representatives of the nation’s citizenry and further promoted Japan into a modern state.
“For the first time， the Japanese people started enjoying the rights as ‘nationals，’ which gave them more confidence in serving their country. This was an important aspect that guaranteed the success of the Meiji Restoration and the later successes in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War （1904-05），” said Zong Zeya， author of The First Sino-Japanese War： 1894-95， published in Beijing in 2012.
With an institutional foundation， reforms in other areas also speeded up during the Meiji Period. Led by the government’s support， communications， transportations， national enterprises and banks developed rapidly.
By the end of the 1870s， more than 150 national banks had opened their doors for business. By the time the first Diet convened in 1890， nearly 10，000 miles of telegraph wire and more than 200 telegraph offices had been built to provide instantaneous communication among the country’s major cities.
Along with state-owned projects， many private enterprises and workshops were also established. Japan’s four great plutocrats—Mitsui， Mitsubishi， Sumitomo and yasuda—were among the prime examples. Meanwhile， many small workshops in filature and textile also sprung up around the country.
“The development of the private enterprises coped with the trend of history， enlarging the social base for the Meiji Restoration，” said Feng Wei， a professor with the Department of History of Shanghai-based Fudan University. According to Feng， the introduction of private entities distinguished the Meiji Restoration from China’s Self-Strengthening Movement. During the Self-Strengthening Movement， almost all the enterprises established by officials were government-supervised.
“The government-supervised enterprises were hybrid operations， and were plagued by the usual bureaucratic inefficiency， corruption and nepotism，” Feng said. “From such enterprises， the guns and ships produced were nowhere comparable in quality to their Japanese counterparts.”
Expanding influence
In the spring of 1894， the Donghak Rebellion broke out in Korea and threatened to overthrow the country’s imperial regime. Answering the requests of the Korean court， China sent in troops to help suppress the rebellion.
Japanese forces claimed that this action by China broke the Convention of Tientsin （now Tianjin）， which the two countries had signed 10 years earlier. The convention stated that China and Japan had to seek approval from one another if either were to send troops into Korea. Japan claimed that China has not sought approval or even notified them， while China asserted that they had contacted Japan and received approval.
In fact， Japan had long intended to weaken Qing influence over Korea and ended up using the incident as an excuse to begin their campaign. After refusing to withdraw its troops in spite of the diplomatic interventions from Russia and Britain， Japan went on to capture Seoul and install a new pro-Japanese government that Japan then used to grant the Japanese Imperial Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army from Korea. Eventually， on August 1， 1894， war was officially declared between Japan and China.
After a series of battles on land and at sea， including the defeat of China’s Beiyang Fleet， which was largely sponsored by Li， and the Battle of the yalu River on September 17， 1894， Japanese troops ultimately crossed the Korean border and entered Qing territory in October the same year.
The losses came as a surprise to the Qing government and foreign observers alike—the German General Staff had predicted Japan’s defeat and William Lang （1843-1906）， a British advisor to the Qing naval forces， had gone as far as to say， “In the end， there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed.”
At the time of the Battle of the yalu River， the Chinese navy had 65 ships， compared to Japan’s 32. However， not all of China’s fleets were mobilized for the battle. Only the Beiyang Fleet， though the largest in China and Asia as a whole at the time which had 25 ships， fought the Japanese.
The fleet also suffered from a crippling shortage of ammunition. Their supply was so low that they had been unable to carry out livefire training and were inadequately trained and prepared for the battle. Of the munitions that they did have， some were of the wrong caliber and unusable， while others were filled with porcelain or cement instead of gunpowder. Many of those that did have gunpowder were—as Philo Mcgiffin， naval advisor to Zhenyuan， a ship in the Beiyang fleet， put it—“Thirteen years old and condemned.”
“From this， we can see how doomed the Qing Dynasty was，” said Xiao yusheng， a researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army （PLA）.
Within the Beiyang command itself， corruption and irregularities were also rampant. Li chose his subordinates according to personal loyalty and willingness to work rather than for their ability and experience.
“A navy is a modern and complicated system. It requires not only modernized ships and weapons but also modernized personnel and management systems. The Beiyang Fleet realized modernization in its weapons， which could not bring about victory at war by themselves，”said Jiang Ming， historian and author of The Fleet That Flew the Dragon Flag， a book on the naval history of the late Qing Dynasty that was first published in Beijing in 2002.
In fact， there needed a thorough modernization of China as a whole. “After nearly 30 years of reform， Japan had become a modern country in which a nationalistic consciousness bonded the government and people into a unified body，” said Pi Mingyong， another researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA. “However， the Chinese general public lacked similar sentiments. In a sense， it was Li but not China that was fighting Japan.”
A lack of introspection
In the two decades before the Jiawu War， Meiji reformers consistently focused on internal reforms at the expense of overseas ventures. They believed that Japan had to modernize at home before it could be adventurous abroad.
In contrast， there was no consensus in the upper echelons of the Qing government concerning an imperative to minimize conflicts abroad. Rather， its policies followed the demands of the faction of the hour. “As a result， Chinese foreign policy remained ineffectual and tragically reckless，” said S. C. M. Paine， an associate professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. “Li did not understand the essentials of modern international politics， which weakened Chinese foreign policy，” said Weng Fei， an Anhuibased scholar on late-Qing history. “He was obsessed with the antiquated tactic of pitting the ‘barbarians’ against one another.”
Li’s diplomatic efforts to seek interventions from Russia and Britain before the war were a typical example. When he finally recognized the inefficiency of his approach， much time had already been lost in making military arrangements.
“The war was a significant contest between China and Japan after a generation of modernization，” said Zhang Haipeng， Director of the Association of Chinese Historians with the CASS.“The defeat broke the Qing Dynasty’s SelfStrengthening Movement and was a testament to its failure.”
“The limited diplomatic， military and technological modernization， without corresponding change in institutions and spirit， was incapable of revitalizing the country and transforming it into a modern state. China’s loss seemed all but inevitable，” Zhang added.
The war also played a decisive role in the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the rise of Japan as an Asian power， according to Dai yi， a professor with Beijing-based Renmin University of China.
“The war reduced China to a prey of Western powers and placed Japan on a fast track to becoming a modern power， especially with the huge war indemnities from China，” Dai said.
On April 17， 1895， China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the treaty， China recognized the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea—a stipulation that actually made Korea more susceptible to Japanese influence. The Qing government also promised to pay Japan 200 million taels（approximately worth $5.3 billion today） in war indemnities and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula， Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.
It also complied with the opening of four more treaty ports， including Suzhou in Jiangsu Province， Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province， Shashi in Hubei Province and Chongqing in the upper reaches of the yangtze River. China also had to give Japanese nationals the right to open factories and engage in industry and manufacturing in China.
“Winning the war made the Japanese more confident in the country’s military superiority. It misled Japan in believing that war and aggression can yield wealth and resources， which put it on a self-destructive path of militarism，” Dai said.
The aftermath
The defeat of China in the Jiawu War altered the fate of China under the Qing Dynasty. “The defeat changed how China was viewed in both the East and the West. The perception of Chinese weakness led to far more aggressive intrusions by foreign powers，” said Paine. Starting from 1897， the imperial powers， including Germany， Russia， Britain， Japan and France， cut China up between them.
However， Zong suggested that there was a silver lining to the defeat. “It was from the war that a true revival movement began， which led to the Hundred Day’s Reform in 1898， the National Revolution in 1911 that overthrew the Qing government， the May Fourth Movement in 1919， and ultimately the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949，” Zong said.
“We should realize it was the First SinoJapanese War that opened the door for the Chinese people to rise to seek the real modernization step by step，” said Ma yong， another researcher with the CASS’ Institute of Modern History.
He said the history also has modern-day applications， as China’s leadership is now emphasizing both reform and a new focus on the country’s development.
“All the implications of history can be boiled down to one sentence： We must build China into a real modern and civilized society， being respected by other countries，” Ma said.
The war， during which China’s then-ruling Qing Dynasty （1644-1911） was defeated， changed the fate of the country. It exposed the dynasty’s weaknesses and led to a scramble for concessions by foreign powers in China. In the aftermath， the country spiraled into enduring political instability and turmoil that culminated with the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty.
A halfway reform
Facing crises within and without， China and Japan both chose reform as the road to reviving their respective societies since the 1860s. While Japan’s Meiji Restoration’s focus was a long-term plan to build Japan into a powerful， modern country， China’s equivalent SelfStrengthening Movement existed only to keep the Qing Dynasty alive.
The Self-Strengthening Movement’s efforts were centered on military and economic reform， such as introducing Western firearms， industrialization， and creating a modern navy.
“There is only one thing we have to learn from the ‘barbarians’—solid ships and effective guns，” scholar Feng Guifen （1809-74） wrote in the early 1860s.
The campaign began in 1861， when Prince Gong （1833-98） and Grand Councilor Wen Xiang （1818-76） proposed establishing a new office to direct foreign affairs.
During his dealings with British and French invaders in the Second Opium War （1856-60）， Prince Gong came to believe Western weaponry to be superior， and discovered that his Western opponents did not try to hide their military secrets—rather， they openly offered to help China train and equip its army after the Western fashion. Prince Gong concluded that China could accommodate the West and build up its military strength with their help.
Another central figure of the SelfStrengthening Movement was Li Hongzhang（1823-1901）， viceroy of Zhili and Minister of Beiyang. His experience with foreign armies and officers during the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion （1851-64） also opened his eyes to advanced technology of the Western armies in Asia.
In 1863， Li warned that if China did not modernize its military， they would have to face a Japan that had looked and would again look to pray on China with its new technology. He asserted that China had to strengthen itself by adopting modern Western firearms and ships to face the coming challenges. Li also instigated earlier attempts at educational reform. He originally supported the proposal for an educational mission in the United States. In 1872， the first group of Chinese boys aged 12-14 were sent to Hartford， Connecticut. In the following years up until 1881， a total of 120 Chinese students were sent in four installments.
Despite all these achievements， historians suggest the Self-Strengthening officials’ preoccupation with firearms， ships and machines and their negligence of Western political systems and culture limited the scope of the Self-Strengthening Movement and ultimately contributed to its failure.
“Their attitude partially stemmed from the belief that China was superior to the West in everything except weaponry，” said Lei yi， a researcher with the Institute of Modern History under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences（CASS）. “With such an attitude， there could be no real modernization.”
“Most of the time， local Self-Strengthening promoters fought with one another rather than cooperating. They usually thought of their achievements as the foundation of personal power，” said Li Renkai （1940-2006）， late professor with the Department of History of Baodingbased Hebei University.
Furthermore， a lack of popular participation also restricted the scope of modernization. Leadership operated in a top-down fashion， with little low-level support as there was during Japan’s Meiji Restoration.
“The primary aim of those SelfStrengthening officials was to save the ramshackle Qing Dynasty. They strove to strengthen the existing order instead of replacing it. They never considered remaking China into a modern state，” Lei said.
A modernizing Japan
Almost from the day they seized power， the Meiji statesmen in Japan had been determined to make their country a modern， powerful， and worthy of respect internationally.
“The men who seized power in 1868 were nationalists who railed against Japan’s semicolonial status. They were Japanese who were sympathetic to the problems confronting their countrymen，” suggested Matsudaira Shungaku（1828-90）， a politician during the Meiji Period（1867-1912）.
During the two Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60， Japan watched in horror as European armies forced their way into China. Their first taste of imperialism came in 1854， when the Americans forced Japan to sign the Convention of Kanagawa， which opened two Japanese ports to the United States along with other favorable arrangements. In 1858， Japan succumbed to continuing Western pressure and signed a set of treaties with the United States， Holland， Britain， France and Russia. The American treaty opened more Japanese ports， allowed commercial activities and set tariff rates.
Against this background， reformers in Japan had pinpointed the need to create more flexible governing institutions that could enlist the abilities of men of talent， promote national unity under the aegis of the Emperor of Japan and build Japan into a great power equal to the most advanced nations on the face of the globe.
Itō Hirobumi （1841-1909） voiced this sentiment when he visited Sacramento， California， in 1872， “We came to study your strength， so that by adopting widely your better ways， we may hereafter be stronger ourselves. We shall labor to place Japan on an equal basis， in the future， with those countries whose modern civilization is now our guide.”
The culmination of the Meiji reforms came in 1889， when the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was promulgated. The constitution established mechanisms for sharing power with elected representatives of the nation’s citizenry and further promoted Japan into a modern state.
“For the first time， the Japanese people started enjoying the rights as ‘nationals，’ which gave them more confidence in serving their country. This was an important aspect that guaranteed the success of the Meiji Restoration and the later successes in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War （1904-05），” said Zong Zeya， author of The First Sino-Japanese War： 1894-95， published in Beijing in 2012.
With an institutional foundation， reforms in other areas also speeded up during the Meiji Period. Led by the government’s support， communications， transportations， national enterprises and banks developed rapidly.
By the end of the 1870s， more than 150 national banks had opened their doors for business. By the time the first Diet convened in 1890， nearly 10，000 miles of telegraph wire and more than 200 telegraph offices had been built to provide instantaneous communication among the country’s major cities.
Along with state-owned projects， many private enterprises and workshops were also established. Japan’s four great plutocrats—Mitsui， Mitsubishi， Sumitomo and yasuda—were among the prime examples. Meanwhile， many small workshops in filature and textile also sprung up around the country.
“The development of the private enterprises coped with the trend of history， enlarging the social base for the Meiji Restoration，” said Feng Wei， a professor with the Department of History of Shanghai-based Fudan University. According to Feng， the introduction of private entities distinguished the Meiji Restoration from China’s Self-Strengthening Movement. During the Self-Strengthening Movement， almost all the enterprises established by officials were government-supervised.
“The government-supervised enterprises were hybrid operations， and were plagued by the usual bureaucratic inefficiency， corruption and nepotism，” Feng said. “From such enterprises， the guns and ships produced were nowhere comparable in quality to their Japanese counterparts.”
Expanding influence
In the spring of 1894， the Donghak Rebellion broke out in Korea and threatened to overthrow the country’s imperial regime. Answering the requests of the Korean court， China sent in troops to help suppress the rebellion.
Japanese forces claimed that this action by China broke the Convention of Tientsin （now Tianjin）， which the two countries had signed 10 years earlier. The convention stated that China and Japan had to seek approval from one another if either were to send troops into Korea. Japan claimed that China has not sought approval or even notified them， while China asserted that they had contacted Japan and received approval.
In fact， Japan had long intended to weaken Qing influence over Korea and ended up using the incident as an excuse to begin their campaign. After refusing to withdraw its troops in spite of the diplomatic interventions from Russia and Britain， Japan went on to capture Seoul and install a new pro-Japanese government that Japan then used to grant the Japanese Imperial Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army from Korea. Eventually， on August 1， 1894， war was officially declared between Japan and China.
After a series of battles on land and at sea， including the defeat of China’s Beiyang Fleet， which was largely sponsored by Li， and the Battle of the yalu River on September 17， 1894， Japanese troops ultimately crossed the Korean border and entered Qing territory in October the same year.
The losses came as a surprise to the Qing government and foreign observers alike—the German General Staff had predicted Japan’s defeat and William Lang （1843-1906）， a British advisor to the Qing naval forces， had gone as far as to say， “In the end， there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed.”
At the time of the Battle of the yalu River， the Chinese navy had 65 ships， compared to Japan’s 32. However， not all of China’s fleets were mobilized for the battle. Only the Beiyang Fleet， though the largest in China and Asia as a whole at the time which had 25 ships， fought the Japanese.
The fleet also suffered from a crippling shortage of ammunition. Their supply was so low that they had been unable to carry out livefire training and were inadequately trained and prepared for the battle. Of the munitions that they did have， some were of the wrong caliber and unusable， while others were filled with porcelain or cement instead of gunpowder. Many of those that did have gunpowder were—as Philo Mcgiffin， naval advisor to Zhenyuan， a ship in the Beiyang fleet， put it—“Thirteen years old and condemned.”
“From this， we can see how doomed the Qing Dynasty was，” said Xiao yusheng， a researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army （PLA）.
Within the Beiyang command itself， corruption and irregularities were also rampant. Li chose his subordinates according to personal loyalty and willingness to work rather than for their ability and experience.
“A navy is a modern and complicated system. It requires not only modernized ships and weapons but also modernized personnel and management systems. The Beiyang Fleet realized modernization in its weapons， which could not bring about victory at war by themselves，”said Jiang Ming， historian and author of The Fleet That Flew the Dragon Flag， a book on the naval history of the late Qing Dynasty that was first published in Beijing in 2002.
In fact， there needed a thorough modernization of China as a whole. “After nearly 30 years of reform， Japan had become a modern country in which a nationalistic consciousness bonded the government and people into a unified body，” said Pi Mingyong， another researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA. “However， the Chinese general public lacked similar sentiments. In a sense， it was Li but not China that was fighting Japan.”
A lack of introspection
In the two decades before the Jiawu War， Meiji reformers consistently focused on internal reforms at the expense of overseas ventures. They believed that Japan had to modernize at home before it could be adventurous abroad.
In contrast， there was no consensus in the upper echelons of the Qing government concerning an imperative to minimize conflicts abroad. Rather， its policies followed the demands of the faction of the hour. “As a result， Chinese foreign policy remained ineffectual and tragically reckless，” said S. C. M. Paine， an associate professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. “Li did not understand the essentials of modern international politics， which weakened Chinese foreign policy，” said Weng Fei， an Anhuibased scholar on late-Qing history. “He was obsessed with the antiquated tactic of pitting the ‘barbarians’ against one another.”
Li’s diplomatic efforts to seek interventions from Russia and Britain before the war were a typical example. When he finally recognized the inefficiency of his approach， much time had already been lost in making military arrangements.
“The war was a significant contest between China and Japan after a generation of modernization，” said Zhang Haipeng， Director of the Association of Chinese Historians with the CASS.“The defeat broke the Qing Dynasty’s SelfStrengthening Movement and was a testament to its failure.”
“The limited diplomatic， military and technological modernization， without corresponding change in institutions and spirit， was incapable of revitalizing the country and transforming it into a modern state. China’s loss seemed all but inevitable，” Zhang added.
The war also played a decisive role in the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the rise of Japan as an Asian power， according to Dai yi， a professor with Beijing-based Renmin University of China.
“The war reduced China to a prey of Western powers and placed Japan on a fast track to becoming a modern power， especially with the huge war indemnities from China，” Dai said.
On April 17， 1895， China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the treaty， China recognized the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea—a stipulation that actually made Korea more susceptible to Japanese influence. The Qing government also promised to pay Japan 200 million taels（approximately worth $5.3 billion today） in war indemnities and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula， Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.
It also complied with the opening of four more treaty ports， including Suzhou in Jiangsu Province， Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province， Shashi in Hubei Province and Chongqing in the upper reaches of the yangtze River. China also had to give Japanese nationals the right to open factories and engage in industry and manufacturing in China.
“Winning the war made the Japanese more confident in the country’s military superiority. It misled Japan in believing that war and aggression can yield wealth and resources， which put it on a self-destructive path of militarism，” Dai said.
The aftermath
The defeat of China in the Jiawu War altered the fate of China under the Qing Dynasty. “The defeat changed how China was viewed in both the East and the West. The perception of Chinese weakness led to far more aggressive intrusions by foreign powers，” said Paine. Starting from 1897， the imperial powers， including Germany， Russia， Britain， Japan and France， cut China up between them.
However， Zong suggested that there was a silver lining to the defeat. “It was from the war that a true revival movement began， which led to the Hundred Day’s Reform in 1898， the National Revolution in 1911 that overthrew the Qing government， the May Fourth Movement in 1919， and ultimately the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949，” Zong said.
“We should realize it was the First SinoJapanese War that opened the door for the Chinese people to rise to seek the real modernization step by step，” said Ma yong， another researcher with the CASS’ Institute of Modern History.
He said the history also has modern-day applications， as China’s leadership is now emphasizing both reform and a new focus on the country’s development.
“All the implications of history can be boiled down to one sentence： We must build China into a real modern and civilized society， being respected by other countries，” Ma said.