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高薪能否起到养廉的作用一直受到政府及学术界的争议。借鉴前人的研究,运用监察博弈模型,通过分析公务员工资收入水平对公务员寻租和政府行政监察概率的影响得出结论:适度提高工资收入既可减少公务员寻租活动,又有助于降低政府监察概率,提高监察效率;但过度提高公务员工资收入不仅对其寻租活动抑止作用微弱,并可能导致其寻租行为更为隐蔽,从而增加监察的难度。因此,要在规范公务员收入,减员增效的基础上,合理增加工资收入,同时提高政府行政监察效率,减少政府过度干预和管制市场,改善公务员寻租的内外环境。
The role of high salaries in raising money has always been the subject of controversy between the government and academia. Draw lessons from previous studies, the use of monitoring game model, by analyzing the level of civil servants salary income on the probability of civil servants rent-seeking and government administration concluded that: a modest increase in wage income can reduce civil servants rent-seeking activities, but also help to reduce the government Monitoring the probability and improving the efficiency of supervision. However, over-raising the salary of civil servants not only weakens their rent-seeking activities, but also may make their rent-seeking behavior more subtle, thus increasing the difficulty of supervision. Therefore, on the basis of standardizing civil servants ’income, downsizing and efficiency, we should increase wage income rationally and at the same time improve the efficiency of government administration and supervision, reduce excessive government intervention and market regulation, and improve civil servants’ rent-seeking internal and external environment.