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本文采用博弈论中的委托代理模型研究了信息对称及不对称情况下企业对同时具有公平关切及风险规避心理特性知识型员工的激励机制问题,并提出一种改进模型降低企业代理成本。研究结果表明:信息对称时,激励机制与风险规避无关,企业效用与公平关切负相关;信息不对称时,员工努力、企业激励程度及收益与风险规避和公平关切均相关。采用“标尺竞争”机制可以有效节约企业代理成本,并且节约的代理成本与员工公平关切负相关。
This paper uses the principal-agent model in game theory to study the incentive mechanism of knowledge-based employees with fair-mindedness and risk-aversion psychology in the case of information asymmetry and asymmetry, and proposes an improved model to reduce agency costs. The results show that incentive mechanism has nothing to do with risk aversion and enterprise utility is negatively correlated with fairness concerns when information is symmetric. Employee effort, firm motivation and profit are related to risk aversion and fairness concerns when information asymmetry. The use of “scale competition ” mechanism can effectively save agency costs, and the cost of agency savings and employee equity concerns are negatively related.