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本文在Barrett(1994)的模型中引入工会,研究环境倾销是否为稳健的战略性环境政策,得到的结论如下:第一,在企业进行产量竞争的情况下,环境倾销是本国政府的最优政策;并且,它的程度比不存在工会情况下的环境倾销程度更大。第二,在企业进行价格竞争的情况下,本国政府的最优环境政策取决于本国工会的工资议价能力和两个企业产品的差异程度的相互作用。一方面,只要本国工会的工资议价能力充分强,本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。另一方面,给定本国工会具有工资议价能力,那么,只要两个企业产品的差异程度充分大,本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。第三,以上讨论蕴含环境倾销可以成为对有工会的国际寡头竞争市场的稳健的战略性环境政策。
This paper introduces trade unions into the model of Barrett (1994) and studies whether environmental dumping is a sound strategic environmental policy. The conclusions are as follows: First, in the case of enterprises competing for output, environmental dumping is the optimal policy of their own governments ; And, to a greater extent than the environmental dumping in the absence of trade unions. Second, in the case of price competition, the optimal environmental policy of the government depends on the interaction between wage bargaining power of the national trade unions and the degree of difference between the two enterprises’ products. On the one hand, as long as the wage bargaining power of its own trade unions is sufficiently strong, its own government will adopt an environmental dumping policy. On the other hand, given the wage bargaining power of its own trade unions, the government will adopt an environmental dumping policy as long as the differences between the two companies’ products are sufficiently large. Thirdly, the above discussion implies that environmental dumping can be a solid strategic environmental policy for the international oligarchs with trade unions.