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公司治理转型背景下,突破单一的内部治理范式,完善以债权人治理为代表的公司外部治理机制,是推进上市公司由行政型治理向经济型治理的重要途径。风险防御驱动下的债权人治理机制是抑制上市公司非效率投资行为,实现债权人权益保护的公司重要外部治理机制。通过在不同控股环境下对异质性债权人防御型治理与上市公司非效率投资水平的关系进行实证研究发现:民营上市公司中,银行的防御型治理对民营上市公司非效率投资具有显著的抑制效应,而在国有上市公司中,其抑制效应稍显乏力;而在两种控股环境中,商业信用债权人的防御型治理不仅失效,反而对非效率投资水平产生刺激效应。
Under the background of corporate governance transformation, to break through a single internal governance paradigm and improve the external governance mechanism represented by creditor governance is an important way to promote listed companies from administrative governance to economic governance. The creditor governance mechanism driven by risk defense is an important external governance mechanism of the listed company to curb inefficient investment behavior and protect the rights and interests of creditors. Through empirical research on the relationship between defensive governance of heterogeneous creditors and the inefficient investment of listed companies in different controlling environments, it is found that the defensive governance of banks in private listed companies has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment of private listed companies However, in the state-owned listed companies, the inhibitory effect is a little weak. In the two controlled environments, the defensive governance of commercial credit creditors not only fails, but also stimulates the inefficient investment.