贝利和米恩斯的结论是,在他们取样的二百家非金融业的最大公司中,一半由经理部门掌握权力。贝利还说,“由于‘所有权’的利益几乎消失得不见了,…又由于经理人员越来越多地是没有所有权的专业人员,于是便出现了一套完全不同的动机与刺激。”米恩斯则认为,被动的业主只应得到少量报酬,但没有所有权的经理仍然把价格定到市场权力所造成的限度。“经理主义”的理论并不反对私营企业,营利的动机也没有消失,传统资本主义第一个要素继续存在。被忽视之点是,当这个要素存在着的时候,严重脱离传统观念中资本主义其他主要特点,大体上是不可能的。如果经理热衷于个人名利,会不会使他朝着离开公司利益的方向发展呢?整个说来这种倾向很小,因为声望、权力、成就感和收入等目标的实现,在很大程度上有赖于公司的成就,而这是由它的利润决定的。公司的良心也许可以集中于这些目标:如销售产品的诚实和最低限度的好风格,避免贿赂顾客的采购人员或竞争者的研究人员,凭良心付税,在政府合同之下正直地交易,当然还要避免共谋与强制。但通过经营领域里主要活动方面的行动故意牺牲企业长期的繁荣似乎不大可能。公司资本主义理论关于股东地位的描绘是有些歪曲的。它把大量不起作用的业主同缺乏业主的影响混淆了。把高级管理人员说成是没有所有权的专业人员,也难得是正确的。通常他们取得相当数量的股权。股东的地位的主要力量在于它的经济方面,而不是支持它的选举权。此外,还有比表决过程更为深刻的法律上的制约。 Bailey and Meynes concluded that half of the 200 largest non-financial companies they sampled were controlled by the managers. Bailey also said, “Since the interest in ’ownership’ has almost disappeared, ... and because managers are increasingly professionals without ownership, a completely different set of motives and incentives has emerged.” Enns believes that passive owners should only receive a small amount of compensation, but managers without ownership still set prices to the limits imposed by market power. The theory of “managerism” does not oppose private companies. The motive for profit has not disappeared. The first element of traditional capitalism continues to exist. The neglected point is that when this element exists, it is largely impossible to deviate from the other major features of capitalism in traditional concepts. If the manager is keen on personal fame and wealth, will he be able to move in the direction of leaving the company’s interests? As a whole, this tendency is small because the realization of goals such as prestige, power, sense of accomplishment and income, to a large extent It depends on the company’s achievements, and this is determined by its profits. The company’s conscience may be able to focus on these goals: such as the honesty and minimalist style of selling products, avoiding the bribery of the buyer or the competitor’s researchers, conscientiously paying taxes, and dealing honestly under government contracts, of course Collusion and coercion must also be avoided. However, it seems unlikely that the long-term prosperity of the company will be deliberately sacrificed through actions in the main areas of operations. The description of the status of shareholders in the theory of corporate capitalism is somewhat distorted. It confuses a large number of inactive owners with the impact of the lack of owners. It is hardly right to speak of senior managers as professionals without ownership. Usually they get a fair amount of equity. The main force of a shareholder’s status lies in its economic aspects, not in supporting its voting rights. In addition, there are more profound legal constraints than the voting process.