一、我国独立董事制度存在的问题(一)独立董事并不独立多数独立董事由大股东提名,很少参与决策的制订,形同虚设。这里有一个简单的逻辑:股东董事代表股东利益——大股东控制董事会——董事会代表大股东利益,从而可以进一步演化为:大股东控制股东会——股东会选举产生独立董事——独立董事代表大股东利益。在这种情况下,即便独立董事参与决策,连职 I. Problems in China’s Independent Director System (I) Independence of Independent Directors Most of the independent directors are nominated by major shareholders and seldom participate in the formulation of decision-making. Here’s a simple logic: the shareholders on behalf of the interests of shareholders - the controlling shareholder of the board of directors - the interests of the board of directors on behalf of major shareholders, which can further evolve into: the controlling shareholder of shareholders - the election of shareholders to produce independent directors - representatives of independent directors The interests of major shareholders. In this case, even if independent directors participate in the decision-making, even the post