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本文详尽疏解了海德格尔对亚里士多德时间定义的现象学解释。在他看来,亚里士多德的时间定义没有“错误”可言,因为一方面,亚里士多德的时间决不是如柏格森所认为的那样就是空间,尽管他把时间的特征首先刻画为诸现在的相继序列,但值得注意的是,诸现在不是诸部分从而把时间拼接在一起成为一个整体;另一方面,当他相关乎“早与晚”来界定时间时,他恰恰是基于时间之为相关乎运动而被计数者来界定时间,所以亚里士多德的时间定义本身并不属于同语反复,相反,他是从事情本身的规定性来说的。尽管亚里士多德的时间观还属于流俗的前科学的时间领会,但它所显示的现象学内容为我们从流俗时间过渡到源始时间提供了一条可靠的进路。
This paper elaborates Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s time definition. In his opinion, Aristotle’s time definition is not “wrong” because, on the one hand, Aristotle’s time is by no means space, as Bergson argues, First, it is portrayed as a succession of sequences of the present, but it is worth noting that now it is not the parts that make the time together as a whole; on the other hand, when he defines the time as “early and late,” he precisely Aristotle’s definition of time is not in itself a repetition of words, but on the contrary, it is based on the prescriptive nature of the work itself. Although Aristotle’s view of time belongs to the popular pre-scientific time frame, its phenomenological content provides us with a credible approach to our transition from popular time to original time.