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文章选取2004-2013年中国42家银行的数据为研究样本,从银行高管的政治联结、金融联结和非金融联结等三种社会联结角度出发,检验银行高管的社会联结是否存在及其对银行风险承担的影响,并进一步考察不同竞争程度、资本充足率水平和上市与否,是否会影响银行高管社会联结变量。研究结果表明:银行高管的三种社会联结存在且都能够显著抑制银行的风险承担,尤其是政治联结和金融联结作用更显著,而非金融联结的影响稍弱。同时,银行业竞争程度有助于提高银行高管的政治联结和金融联结对银行风险承担的抑制作用;资本充足率监管有助于增强三种社会联结对银行风险承担的抑制作用;上市能够促进政治联结和金融联结抑制银行的风险承担作用,却加大具有非金融联结的银行高管风险承担激励倾向。
This article selects the data of 42 banks in China from 2004 to 2013 as the research sample and examines the existence of the social bond of the bank’s senior executives from the perspectives of the banking executives’ political connections, financial connections and non-financial links Bank risk exposure and further examine different levels of competition, capital adequacy ratio and the availability of the market, whether it will affect the bank’s executives of social-linked variables. The results show that the existence of three kinds of social bonds of bank executives can significantly inhibit the risk appetite of banks, especially the political connection and financial link are more significant than the non-financial link. At the same time, the level of competition in the banking industry helps to improve the bank’s senior executives’ political connection and the financial bond’s inhibitory effect on the bank’s risk appetite. The regulation of capital adequacy ratio helps to strengthen the inhibitory effect of the three social connections on the bank’s risk appetite. Political connection and financial connection inhibit the bank’s risk-taking role, but increase the risk-taking incentives of bank executives with non-financial links.