论文部分内容阅读
研究了政府奖惩机制下零售商主导闭环供应链中各参与主体的回收决策问题,建立了3种情形的决策模型并比较了各情形下的最优决策。结果表明:奖惩机制能够有效引导制造商提高回收率,促使零售商降低零售价、制造商降低批发价。与无奖惩机制相比,引入奖惩机制有利于零售商利润的提高,当政府规定的最低回收率较低且奖惩力度较大时,制造商利润提高,而当规定的最低回收率较高时,制造商利润降低。
This paper studies the decision-making problems of retailers in the closed-loop supply chain under the government rewards and punishments mechanism, and establishes the decision-making model of three kinds of situations and compares the optimal decision under each situation. The results show that the reward and punishment mechanism can effectively guide the manufacturer to increase the recovery rate, make retailers reduce the retail price and reduce the wholesale price. Compared with no rewards and punishments mechanism, the introduction of reward and punishment mechanism is conducive to the improvement of retailer profits, when the government provides a lower minimum recovery rate and rewards and punishments, manufacturers profits increase, and when the minimum recovery rate is higher, Manufacturer profits lower.