根据经典的斯坦克尔伯格数量博弈,先行进入市场的厂商总是可以抢先占领一系列诸如市场需求空间和上下游渠道等资源,并在消费者购买和品牌塑造上占据优势。但是,事实上依据其成本的大小并不是所有抢先进入市场的厂商都会如此。本文以经典的斯坦克尔伯格竞争模型为基础,引入成本—利润差曲线,深入考察了成本对厂商先后动的影响机理。本文的主要贡献在于,确定了厂商先后动的临界成本点和成本区间,确立了在不同成本结构下高成本厂商的先动和低成本厂商的后动策略理论,丰富和扩展了对现有斯坦克尔伯格竞争模型的理解。 According to the classic Steinkerburger number game, first-into-market vendors can always preempt a series of resources such as market demand space and upstream and downstream channels, and have an advantage in consumer buying and branding. However, in fact, depending on the cost, not all vendors who first enter the market will do so. Based on the classical Steinkelberg competition model, this paper introduces the curve of cost-profit difference, and deeply inspects the mechanism of the impact of cost on the firm’s successive moves. The main contribution of this paper is to determine the critical cost points and cost ranges that have been used by manufacturers, and to establish a post-movement strategy theory for high-cost manufacturers’ first movers and low-cost vendors under different cost structures, which has enriched and expanded existing ones. Kelberger’s understanding of the competition model.