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由于代理问题和信息不对称,管理层并不以价值最大化为自身目标,而是追求自身利益最大化。上市公司由于其自身资金雄厚、融资有国家支持等优势,且管理层为了自身利益,盲目做大投资,造成了上市公司资金利用率低下,价值创造效率低等问题,由此可见管理层对央企企业价值具有重要的影响。一般认为,在公司治理结构下,管理层激励能够降低管理层片面追求公司业绩而忽略投资的有效性问题,进而提升企业价值。文章从理论分析的角度探讨管理层激励是否能够提升企业价值以及管理层激励是如何提升企业价值的。
Because of agency problems and information asymmetry, management does not maximize its value as its own goal, but the pursuit of maximizing their own interests. Listed companies because of its own well-funded, state-owned financing and other advantages, and management for their own interests, blindly big investment, resulting in low capital utilization of listed companies, the value of creating low efficiency, we can see that the management of central enterprises Corporate value has an important impact. It is generally believed that under the structure of corporate governance, management incentives can reduce management’s one-sided pursuit of corporate performance while neglecting the effectiveness of investment, thereby enhancing corporate value. From the perspective of theoretical analysis, the article discusses whether management incentives can enhance the value of the enterprise and how management incentives can enhance the enterprise value.