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垄断产业的规制是国家经济政策的一个重要组成部分,其规制体制改革也成为人们关注的焦点。在目前,多数学者将研究的重点放在垄断企业的激励规制改革方面,而对规制的另一组成部分规制治理重视的不够。规制治理的一个重要问题就是政府承诺的可信性问题。笔者认为政府承诺的可信性问题是规制激励成功实施的一个重要保证。本文通过运用新制度经济学理论和博弈论工具对垄断产业规制改革为什么需要政府可信承诺,如何实施可信承诺问题进行了探讨,并在此基础上对如何加强我国政府承诺的可信性提出了合理化建议。
The regulation of monopoly industries is an important part of the state’s economic policies and its regulatory system reform has also become the focus of attention. At present, most scholars focus their research on the incentive regulation reform of monopoly enterprises, while they pay insufficient attention to the regulation and control of another part of the regulation. An important issue of regulation and control is the credibility of the government’s commitment. The author believes that the credibility issue promised by the government is an important guarantee for the successful implementation of regulatory incentives. By using the new institutional economics theory and the game theory tools, this paper discusses why trust in the government needs to be credible and how to implement credible commitments in monopoly industrial regulation reforms, and on this basis, puts forward some suggestions on how to strengthen the credibility of our government commitment Reasonable suggestions.